The deadly five-alarm fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po has triggered intense public and professional scrutiny regarding the construction material choices and oversight during the public housing estate’s recent major renovation. Central to the investigation are the roles of the main contractor, Prestige Construction & Engineering Co. Limited, and the consulting firm managing the refurbishment, Will Power Architects Company Limited, particularly concerning the use of highly flammable foam panels to enclose windows.
The devastating blaze has brought to light a significant dispute between the consultant and industry sources regarding the authority over material selection. A senior project officer from Will Power Architects publicly stated that he had previously advised strongly against using quick-seal foam panels for window enclosure, recommending non-flammable plywood instead. The officer, who also reportedly represented the firm at a November 30 residents’ meeting at the On Kay Court estate in Ngau Tau Kok—another Will Power project—claimed that since the consultancy was not the direct employer, he lacked the authority to veto the contractor’s choice of materials.
Authority and Liability: Who Approved the Foam?
This account is sharply contested by industry sources familiar with the project’s procurement process. These sources contend that the general structure of the project management dictated that the consulting firm was indeed responsible for vetting and approving purchase requests. According to these claims, contractors were required to submit all material procurement requests directly to Will Power for authorization, suggesting the consultancy held ultimate influence over material selection despite not being the direct employer. Furthermore, residents had allegedly voiced safety concerns regarding the projected materials directly to the firm prior to the fire.
The renovation of Wang Fuk Court was planned in three distinct phases. The main contractor, Prestige Construction, reportedly pushed to use foam boards to cover external windows during the initial phase. This move was met with immediate resistance from certain homeowners, who cited the high flammability of foam and demanded the substitution of fire-retardant alternatives.
The renovation phases were segmented as follows:
- Phase One: Wang Cheong House, Wang Shing House, and Wang Chi House.
- Phase Two: Wang Sun House, Wang Kin House, and Wang Tai House.
- Phase Three: Wang Yan House and Wang Tao House.
A circular distributed by the contractor to homeowners, addressing “External Wall Window Protection and Chiselling Works at Window Reveals,” stated a commitment to shielding external windows before work commenced and explicitly accepting liability for any subsequent damage. However, the document critically failed to specify the type of protective material that would be utilized, leaving the contentious choice open to interpretation.
Demand for Transparent Safety Protocols
The tragedy underscores critical shortcomings in safety protocols, oversight, and communication during large-scale residential renovation projects in Hong Kong. Experts emphasize that in projects involving public housing estates, the overriding priority must be the selection of fire-safe building materials, regardless of cost or ease of installation.
The ongoing investigation is expected to focus on formal contracts to determine the precise allocation of authority concerning material sign-off and liability between the government, the consultancy, and the main contractor. The outcome will likely set a strict precedent for mandating transparent and rigorous fire safety standards in future public estate refurbishment initiatives, offering much-needed clarity on the roles of project consultants in ensuring resident safety.